Introduction
When Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin began their tour of India in November 1955, Pravda celebrated the visit with breathless references to the "flourish [ing] friendship between the Indian and Soviet peoples." While such rhetoric was -and would become even more -familiar, it marked a significant change from earlier coverage that But before any of these well-publicized visits or agreements came a set of lower-profile exchanges that had just as profound an effect -if not more -on Indo-Soviet relations and perhaps on the Soviet Union itself. These visits in 1954-56 were intended to shape India's Second Five Year Plan, which stood strikingly at the intersection of Indian economic history and the international history of the Cold War. This Working Paper examines some of the early Soviet contacts with Indian planners to show the effects on economists and economic ideas in both countries. focused upon government resources and investments. But Mahalanobis himself had a different vision for planning, one he claimed to share with Nehru and his circle. They had in mind a plan that encompassed all aspects of the economy, not just government spending; it would include the bulk of the economy that was in the private sector. It would be more interested in how much was produced and consumed rather than how much it cost -"physical" as opposed to "financial" planning. This vision shared much with the Soviet planning system's Balance of the National Economy (balans narodnogo khoziaistva), and thus Mahalanobis wanted to take advantage of the Soviet Union's "vast experience with planning." Thus, he claimed, Nehru's circle had a great need for Soviet advisors in planning. As committed as he was to seeking Soviet help, though, Mahalanobis did not want to roil international waters. He proposed that the exchange avoid the appearance of an official governmental program, and instead be organized between scholarly institutions -his ISI working with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. "No need," he told his Soviet interlocutors, to "excite (draznit') those unfriendly to India and the USSR."
One of the key figures seeking the expansion of Indo-Soviet scientific ties was Prasanta
Finally, he suggested that each delegation's costs be covered by the country that sent it; this would reduce the appearance of dependence -and would have the added benefit of protecting Indian foreign exchange reserves. 7 For their part, Soviet scholars were optimistic that a visiting delegation could serve multiple purposes. They noted that Indian scholars were well-versed in Anglo-American scholarship, but had little exposure to Soviet work. An effective delegation represented a chance to establish a Soviet beachhead in Indian intellectual life. If followed by an effort to translate Soviet publications into English, and with exchange programs bringing Indian scholars and students to the USSR, a Soviet delegation could be the first step in building Soviet intellectual influence in India more generally. 8 Soviet aims went beyond general intellectual influence, though, and included hopes that they could shape Indian policy. Closer Indo-Soviet scholarly ties, one apparatchik noted, would also facilitate the "long-term strengthening the authority of the USSR and its science" in India. Mahalanobis used his next trip to Moscow in July 1954 to work out the details for the Soviet delegation trip to come that autumn, and to press the case for expanded Soviet ties. 13 Both sides came away from the conversations with heightened enthusiasm for the possibility of using Soviet experience and expertise to shape Indian planning. The Soviet Minister of Culture G.F. Aleksandrov covered a wide range of topics in his conversation with Mahalanobis, all of which would expand Soviet-Indian relations through the exchange of artistic delegations, films, music, and publications. 14 While Soviet officials were eager to build intellectual bridges to India, they hesitated to get directly involved in economic advising. As one memorandum regarding that 1954 delegation put it with scare quotes to demonstrate uncertainly about whether India was in fact engaged in planning in the Soviet sense:
The task of our Soviet economists should be limited to consultations, communicating our experience. We should not take responsibility for the formulation of a perspective "plan" or become official advisors and experts working out this "plan." 15 Mahalanobis apparently ignored such reticence. He envisioned flows of economic expertise in the context of a larger effort to "strengthen the bonds of friendship" between the two nations. 16 offered a plan that differed dramatically from the somewhat scattershot and unambitious first plan; Mahalanobis called the first plan an "anthology," but wanted the second plan to be a "drama." 25 The Second Plan aimed to increase national income dramatically -by 5% per year.
It also called for unemployment to be "liquidated" -common Soviet terminology -within a decade. The key to this growth would be heavy industry, which would be "expanded with all possible speed" -and in the public sector. Thus the Plan called for tripling steel production in parameters of the Second Plan were already well established; ISI economists were working out the details of the Plan, not the ultimate structure.
That structure, furthermore, bore some resemblance to the Soviet vision. Hence it is little surprise that Soviet observers, from Khrushchev and Bulganin through scholars at the Academy of Sciences, praised India's Second Five-Year Plan. As the doyen of Soviet Indologists, R.A.
Ul'ianovskii, put it, "the fact that India is borrowing from the planning experience of the socialist countries in its effort to escape from backwardness and to suppress its economic dependence on foreign capital by the country's industrialization is fact of enormous progressive significance." 31 Soviet observers by and large concurred with Mahalanobis's logic that rapid industrialization could serve as a protection against the depredations of global monopoly capitalism. 32 Yet all of this cheerleading -Soviet observers rooting for public sector industry and planning, American experts for agriculture, private sector and markets -ultimately had little effect. While the economic advice was widely solicited, at great expense and effort for many individuals and institutions, the net effect of the whole foreign advising enterprise was very close to zero. This meager result was in large part by design; the purpose of the whole advising enterprise was not to emulate other models but to learn specific techniques, from Western economists and East-Bloc planners alike. As Mahalanobis put it, "I am completely convinced that, if we are serious, we shall be able to get the fullest technical information and help in planning from the USSR." And his travels convinced him, he told one friend and colleague, that "there is nothing ready-made in the West which we can acquire or transfer… [but] I also know that we can use some of the Western economists to our great advantage." Reaching across the Cold War divide, then, Mahalanobis sought the technical expertise necessary to formulate the full Second Plan.
Yet the foreign experts and Mahalanobis's own overseas travels served another purpose as well. They provided external validation for the efforts of the Planning Commission, validation that Mahalanobis could (and did) cite in seeking domestic political support for his aims. The steady stream of visiting experts gave him the standing to defend policies that he had sought in the first place. As he was the first to acknowledge, foreigners' expert advice on economic planning helped win domestic political battles over the size and shape of the Second Five-Year Plan. He compared the role of foreign experts to "airforce cover for the army": their advice did not necessarily change the direction of attack, but provided helpful firepower supporting what was already under way. 33 Elsewhere Mahalanobis noted that the "greatest benefit" of the visitors was that they reinforced his ideas: "through contacts with such eminent experts from many different countries we gained confidence in our way of thinking." 34 nature of socialism around the world. That concept -the "non-capitalist path" was (like most innovations in Soviet thought) attributed to Lenin. It would be mistaken, the Bolshevik leader told a Comintern gathering in 1920, to assume that "the backward nations must go through the capitalist path of development." 35 Khrushchev opened the door for a revival of this concept in one of his less-famous (and shorter) speeches at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956:
"The forms of the transition to socialism," he told Party leaders, will become all the more variable" and may not "always be connected with Civil War." 36 did was to give a more precise character to the policy which had been developed" over the previous year. 37 A few months later M.I. Rubinshtein seemed like he was adding footnotes to Khrushchev's claim from the Twentieth Party Congress when he published a two-part article in the high-profile English journal New Times. He argued that the path to socialism need not -as orthodox Marxists had long argued -run through capitalism en route to Communism. India's experience, Rubinshtein indicated, suggested an alternative path, one that might not even entail violent revolution. He rehearsed the recent talk of socialism in India, including the recent Congress Party declaration that its ultimate aim was to create a "socialistic pattern of society."
As a geologist at a huge section (razrez) sees strata of different geological eras, so too the economist can see firsthand in modern India the elements and the remnants of various socio-economic systems. The remnants of the distant past, the complex and often contradictory present, and the first germs of the future are interwoven in a bizarre combination. Sometimes these germs [of the future] are still weak. They often try to drown the weeds of the old and obsolete world. But these germs will win because you can not slow the wheel of history (koleso istorii). 39 Contemporary India, in other words, contained a mixture of different historical stages along the inevitable path towards socialism. It was not, therefore, easily categorized in the familiar terms of Soviet Marxism, but was a "bizarre combination" all its own. Yet he was not yet ready to name that historical stage. Rubinshtein's next reflection on India was similarly guarded, but at the same time suggested a new conception of Indian development. As most Soviet observers did, he celebrated the emphasis on heavy industry, but praised it in unusual terms. Heavy industry was important, Rubinshtein insisted, because it provided a mechanism for establishing economic independence and also for improving the living conditions of the "popular masses." The notion that capitalist industrialization could improve living conditions, especially since Rubinshtein here and elsewhere dismissed Indian claims that they were building socialism. 40 By the time Rubinshtein published a pamphlet on India in 1956, he emphasized the significant differences between Soviet and Indian approaches to economic issues, and noted that it was not the task of the Soviet Union (or, for that matter, of the Communist Party of India) to remake India in its own image. 41 And shortly thereafter came the New Times articles, which used India as a jumping-off point to articulate fully the theory of a non-capitalist path to development.
Rubinshtein's travel to and studies of India, then, accelerated the broader Soviet reconsideration of the noncapitalist path, and with it a core element of Soviet eschatology. destination for history -Communism -but there was, theoretically at least, more than one way to get there. The Soviet encounter with India, its first close-up encounter with colonies and former colonies of Europe after the Stalinist deep-freeze, contributed to a major revision of Soviet ideology.
Ironically, then, the early missions from Moscow to Delhi had, perhaps, a stronger effect on the sending country than the recipients. Mahalanobis's enthusiasm for importing planning helped him build a technical edifice for his vision of Indian economic policy -and to build domestic support for it. But he did not seek to build an Indian version of Gosplan. For the Soviets, meanwhile, the encounter with India contributed to a reimaging of the developing world.
The teachers, in other words, had learned from their students.
